Abstract. It is well known that meta-computation can be used to guide other computations (at the object-level), and thereby reduce the costs of these computations. However, the question arises to what extent the cost of meta-computation o setts the gains made by object-level savings. In this paper we discuss a set of equations that model this trade-o between object-savings and meta-costs. The model shows that there are a number of important limitations on the usefulness of meta-computation, and we investigate the parameters that determine these limitations.
Introduction
One of the most often stated aims of meta-programmingis search-control: a metaprogram is used to guide the computation at the object-level. Often, this takes the form of a meta-program choosing among multiple applicable object-level computations. A large body of literature exists on this type of meta-programs, in areas like knowledge-representation, (logic-)programming and theorem proving.
Although many other types of meta-programs are both possible and useful, this paper will only consider meta-programs that are used to guide the computation at the object-level. This type of meta-program gives rise to a tradeo situation, in which costs should be compared with bene ts. The bene t of meta-computation is that it leads to a better choice among object-computations, and therefore to savings at the object-level, since useless or expensive objectcomputations can be avoided (see e.g. 1] for results in the area of theorem proving). On the other hand, meta-computations themselves often have a considerable cost, and this cost might o set any savings that are obtained by that very same computation.
This trade-o (between savings made by meta-level choices and the costs of having to make these choices) has been recognised in the literature: 5], 2] and 4, chapter 7] report on experimental results on measuring the size of the metalevel overhead, and the large literature on partial evaluation tries to reduce the size of this overhead.
The goal of this paper is to investigate a theoretical model of the costs and bene ts of meta-computation. After setting out the formal assumptions that underlie this work (Sect. 2), we present in Sect. 3 a quantitative model developed by 6]. In the context of this model, we postulate some reasonable properties of meta-computations (Sect. 4) , and illustrate the model with some examples (Sect. 5). In Sect. 6 we extend and generalise the basic model from Sect. 3.
Assumptions
We will assume that there are two independent methods for solving a particular object-level problem, and we will call these methods x and y 1 . We also assume that each of these methods has a certain expected cost, which we will denote by c x and c y . Furthermore, we assume that x and y are heuristic methods, i.e. they are not guaranteed to solve the object-problem. Instead, we will assume that each method has a speci c chance of solving the given object-problem, which we will write as p x and p y .
The goal of the meta-computationis to choose among the two object-methods x and y in order to solve a given problem in such a way that the overall cost of the object-computation is minimised. Because in general x and y are not guaranteed to solve the problem (p x and p y might be smaller than 1), the meta-computation must not choose between either x or y, but it must choose the ideal ordering of x and y: rst try x, and if it fails, then try y, or vice versa. We will write c x;y to denote the expected cost of rst executing x followed by y if x fails, and similarly for c y;x .
The meta-computation that determines this choice will again have a certain cost, which we will write as c m . Again, we will assume that this metacomputation is heuristic, i.e. it will make the correct choice of how to order x and y only with a certain chance, which we will write as p m .
We assume that without meta-level computation, the system will try to use the two methods in a random order to solve the object-problem. The goal of the model will be to compute the savings (or losses, i.e. negative savings) that are obtained by using meta-computation to choose the ordering of x and y instead of making a random choice 2 . These expected savings will be denoted by s.
All of this notation (plus some additional notation used in later sections) is summarised in Table 1 .
The Savings Function
In this section, we will derive the expression for the expected savings obtained by making a correct meta-level choice concerning the optimal order in which to execute two object-level methods.
Given the assumptions about x, y, c x , c y , p x and p y , the expected cost of executing x before y, c x;y is: c x;y = c x + (1 ? p x )c y
1
In Sect. 6, we will show how the model can be extended to deal with an arbitrary number of methods. 2 In Sect. 6 we will show how the model can be adjusted to accommodate the more realistic assumption that the system will execute the methods in some xed order if no meta-computation is done. namely the expected cost of executing x plus the expected cost of executing y, but reduced by the chance that y is not executing because x has succeeded in solving the problem. An analogous expression holds for c y;x . Notice that (1) reduces to simply the expected cost of c x when x is a complete method (i.e when p x = 1).
The decision to try x before y should be made when c x;y < c y;x (2) or equivalently, using (1): p y =c y < p x =c x : (3) The quantity x = p x =c x can be seen as a measure of the utility of method x. The utility of a method x increases with its success rate p x and decreases with its expected costs c x . The above inequality (3) says that the method with the highest utility should be tried rst.
However, the values for success rates and expected costs of x and y (and therefore the values of (x) and (y)) will not in general be available to the system, and will have to be computed at the cost of some meta-level e ort, c m . Once the meta-level has estimated (x) and (y), the optimal ordering of the two methods can be determined. We can now derive the expteced savings s made by executing the methods in this optimal order as follows: we assume that without any meta-level e ort, the system chooses a random ordering of x and y.
The expected savings are then the cost of executing a randomly chosen ordering minus the cost of executing the methods in the optimal ordering, increased with the cost of nding the optimal ordering: savings = cost-of-random-ordering | (cost-of-chosen-ordering + meta-level-cost) and the expected cost of executing the methods in a random order is: c x;y + c y;x 2 :
If the system spends c m on meta-level e ort and then chooses x before y as the optimal ordering, the expected execution cost would be: c x;y + c m :
(5) The expected savings would then be the di erence between these two formulae: c y;x ? c x;y 2 ? c m : (6) This would be the expected savings if the system preferred x over y on the basis of its estimates of (x) and (y). In general, we cannot expect that the metalevel will always succeed in computing the true values of (x) and (y). We can adjust our model to the assumption that the meta-level prefers x over y (i.e. it claims (x) > (y)), but that this decision is only correct with a probability p m .
In this case, the expected execution costs would be p m c x;y + (1 ? p m )c y;x + c m :
If we subtract this from the costs of executing a random ordering, and simplify the result, we get: where is notation for jc x;y ? c y;x j = jp y c x ? p x c y j. The intuitive interpretation of is that it represents the di erence in costs between the optimal and the non-optimal object-scenario's (executing rst x and then, if necessary, y, or vice versa). This concludes the derivation of the savings function (which closely followed 6]).
An alternative derivation for s is as follows: the expected gains made by making the correct choice between x;y or y;x are jc x;y ?c y;x j = . If the chance of a correct meta-decision is only p m , the maximal expected gains are reduced to p m . The savings made by a random choice would already have been ). This is already a severe limit on what meta-level computations can gain.
This maximal savings of 1 2 also puts an upper limit on the maximum amount of meta-e ort that we should invest: because the expected savings can never amount to more than 1 2 , it will certainly never be useful to make c m larger than this same amount. Thus, any potential losses by spurious meta-computation could be limited given an estimate of .
Furthermore, we see that s is monotonically increasing with , and this makes sense: the larger the di erence in expected costs between the di erent object-computations, the larger the expected savings to be made by metacomputation. In the boundary case, when = 0 and the ordering of objectcomputations is irrelevant, the expteced savings will be negative (since in that case, s = ?c m ), and meta-computations will lead to a loss in overall e ciency.
Finally, we see that when p m = 1 2 , i.e. when the meta-level decision does not improve over a random choice, meta-computation will again only lead to a loss in overall e ciency (s = ?c m ), as expected.
Properties of Meta-computations
In realistic situations, the value of p m , the probability of making a correct choice between methods, will be dependent on the amount of meta-level e ort spent, 
Upperbound: Since f(c m ) is a probability, we certainly expect 0 f(c m ) 1.
Together with (12) and (13) this gives: (17) The only signi cance of this function is that it obeys conditions (12){(16), but otherwise it is arbitrary. It serves to illustrate the case where a relatively small amount of meta-level e ort results in substantially improved performance, while there are diminishing returns for subsequent e ort. Its convergence to p m = 1 for c m ! 1 is arbitrary, and does not in uence the qualitative shape of the savings curve for s(c m ) shown in Fig. 1b . In this gure, we can see that at a certain point, the expected savings achieved by meta-computation reach a maximum, and any further meta-level e ort will only reduce the overall savings. With even more e ort spent on meta-computation, the system will eventually behave worse than without any meta-level e ort at all.
It is instructive to notice that at the point of maximal expected savings, the value of p m is 1 ? 1 (simply substitute ln( =2) in (17)). This shows that for large , it pays to spend e ort trying to get p m close to 1, whereas for smaller , a small value of p m is all that we can a ord to compute. The costs of computing any better approximation of p m will then not be paid back by the corresponding savings in object-computations. shown as the solid line in Fig. 2b , where again the expected savings reach a maximumat some point, beyond which further meta-level e ort will only degrade the performance of the system. Example 3: Whereas the previous examples showed meta-computations which improved the behaviour of the control decision gradually (in accordance with (16)), a nal example shows what happens if meta-level reliability improves suddenly after some initial e ort. Figure 3a shows the case of a meta-level which needs some initial e ort to compute a good choice between object-computations, but whose quality does not improve after having made its decision: The corresponding savings curve is shown in Fig. 3b . The interesting property of this curve is that the expected savings are initially negative (0 c m < c), and only become positive after a required minimum amount of e ort. This is an important di erence with the previous two examples: there, insu cient meta-e ort might lead to non-maximal savings, but would never lead to actual losses, whereas the meta-computation of this third example does indeed yield losses at insu cient meta-e ort. This third example shares with the previous two examples the property that too much meta-e ort leads to reduced gains, and eventually to losses over no meta-computation at all.
Extensions
The simple model above can extended in a number of ways.
Complete Methods
The rst extension is not really an extension, but rather a special case: our current model deals with heuristic methods which would have to be tried in sequence and we therefore have to take into account the expected costs of executing the second method in those cases where the rst method failed. We might also consider choosing between complete object-methods, which always succeed.
The choice is then not between executing rst x and then y or vice versa, but between executing either x or y. The model deals with this situation as a simple special case. We simply take p x = p y = 1. Then reduces to jc x ? c y j, i.e. the di erence between the expected costs of executing either x or y as expected .
Harder Meta-level Problems
We call one meta-level problem harder than another if for the same amount of meta-level e ort c m , the system achieves a lower value of p m (i.e. the choice between the applicable methods is made less reliably).
In the case of the de nition for f(c m ) used in example 2, harder meta-level problems are represented by an increasing value of c, and are indicated by the family of dashed lines in Fig. 2a . The corresponding behaviour of the saving function s(c m ) is shown by the dashed lines in Fig. 2b . We see that when the meta-level problem gets harder, the optimum meta-level e ort is found for a larger value of c m , and the corresponding savings are reduced.
This behaviour illustrates a phenomenon often observed in developing metalevel systems, namely that the usefulness of meta-level inference cannot be illustrated adequately on very simple toy problems. For those problems, c will be very small, and any signi cant amount of meta-level e ort is likely to be larger than c, and will thus overshoot the point of maximum expected savings. is shown in this example: harder meta-level problems not only lead to reduced maximumexpected savings, but the savings function is also positive on a smaller interval, making the balance for meta-computation even more delicate.
Number of Methods
Rather than modelling just two methods x and y, we can adjust the model to choose between n methods (a suggestion also made by 6]). Expression (1) can be generalised from 2 to n methods, so that the expected cost of executing methods x 1 ;:::;x n in that order is: (21) (i.e. the total cost is the sum of the cost of each method multiplied with the chance that all earlier methods failed). The optimal order for executing the methods would of course be some order x i1 ; :::;x in such that for all j, 1 j n ? 1 : (x ij ) (x ij+1 )
Before we can derive the savings function for this generalised case, we must introduce some notation. The methods x 1 ;:::;x n can be executed in n! di erent orders, and we shall denote each such sequence by some j , 1 j n!. Then c j is the expected cost associated with executing such a sequence (written as c xk;:::;xm in (21)). Furthermore, let us assume that 1 is the optimal order (i.e. it satis es (x k ) (x l ) whenever x k occurs earlier in 1 than x l ). With this notation, we can derive the savings function analogously to the case n = 2 in Sect. 3. The expected cost of executing the methods x 1 ;:::;x n in a random order (i.e. the generalised version of (4)) is:
Equation (7), the expected cost of executing the optimal method ( 1 ) 
namely: the cost of 1 times the probability that 1 was chosen, plus the chance that any of the other methods was chosen times the average cost of one of the other methods, plus the cost of making the meta-level choice. As before, the expected savings of a meta-computation is the di erence between these two formula. Subtracting (23) from (22) 
Equation (25) shows us that the proper interpretation of is the di erence between the cost of the correct choice and the average cost of an incorrect choice.
In the case n = 2, this reduces to the di erence in expected costs between the two possible sequences, c 2 ? c 1 , written as c y;x ? c y;x in Sect. 3.
From the generalised savings function shown in (24), we see that the maximal expected savings are (1 ? 1 n! ) . If we assume that stays more or less constant with increasing n (since there is no reason why the average cost of a set of methods must increase or decrease for larger sets), we can conclude that for increasing n, the maximal expected savings will increase and will rapidly approach (within 1% for n = 5). This gives a slightly rosier perspective on the maximal expected savings to be made by meta-computation than originally derived in Sect. 3, where the expected savings were limited to 
Initial Ordering of Methods
The model assumed that with no meta-level e ort, the system would make an arbitrary choice for the order in which it executed its object-methods x and y. A more realistic assumption would be that the system would apply x and y in some xed order, say rst x and then y, on the basis of some a priori knowledge that the system's designer has about (x) and (y). Suppose that with no metae ort, the system chooses x before y, and that this choice is indeed the right one with a chance p 0 . In other words, the value f(0), the quality of the meta-level decision at no meta-e ort, is no longer 1 2 , as speci ed in (13), but is now p 0 .
Presumably, (27) To derive the new value of the savings function, we follow the derivation of (10) above. In this derivation, we subtracted the savings made by a random choice ( Finally, the value of (28) is always smaller than the value of (9), because p 0 > 1 2 . For the same reason, the maximum expected savings that can be obtained by a meta-computation are reduced from 1 2 to (1 ? p 0 ) . This is just what one would expect, since without meta-e ort, the system performs better than it did before, and as a result, the potential savings that can be made by the meta-computation are smaller.
Discussion
The problem of choosing the correct amount of meta-e ort in order to optimise the total savings is very similar to the problems tackled in classical decision theory (e.g. 7]). A number of the e ects that we have observed in the models above are also well known in decision theory. In particular, the fact that the maximal savings are limited to 1 2 (in the case n = 2) is known as the base-rate e ect: the gains of an informed decision are limited if a random choice already performs well (when the \base-rate" is already high), as in the case of n = 2. The reduction of the base-rate and the corresponding increase in maximal savings for increasing n (to (1 ? 1 n! ) ) is also a known e ect. The law of diminishing returns (in our case modelled by assumption (16)) is also familiar from decision theory. Decision theory also gives us an explanation of the counterintuitive results at the end of the previous section for the case of zero or in nite failure costs. In decision theory this is called the boundary e ect: if one of the dimensions in a multi-dimensional decision problem becomes 0 or 1, then the model is no longer valid because this single dimension will entirely dominate all the other dimensions. In such cases, we should move to a new model, rather than simply substitute 0 or 1 in the old model.
An interesting application of our theoretical model can possibly be found in the area of explanation-based learning. A well-known problem in that area is the so-called utility problem 3]: learning more control knowledge does not always lead to more e cient problem-solving behaviour, and learning too much may actually adversely a ect e ciency. At rst sight, it would seem that this e ect could be explained by a model similar to ours. Further research is required to shed lighton this issue.
Finally, a remark is in order on the usefulness of our model. One might object that the above results are not very useful since in practice it will be very hard, if not impossible, to obtain the actual values for the costs and probabilities involved in a particular system. The main value of our model is therefore a di erent one: rather than using it to compute numerical values in a concrete system, it teaches us general lessons about the qualitative behaviour of a whole class of meta-systems in general, lessons which are sometimes surprising and perhaps not obvious at rst sight.
Conclusions
We can summarise the main conclusions from this model as follows: { The model shows that a trade-o does indeed exist between the costs of meta-computation and the savings obtained by it. This results in a situation where savings are maximised at a certain amount of meta-e ort. Both more and less meta-e ort will lead to non-maximal savings.
{ Meta-computation may also lead to a loss in e ciency (when compared to doing only object-computation). This will always happen if the meta-e ort becomes greater than a certain maximum (too much meta-e ort), but might also happen in certain cases if meta-e ort is less than a certain minimum(not enough meta-e ort). The loss of overall e ciency at high amounts of metae ort explains the phenomenon that the usefulness of meta-computation is often hard to illustrate on the basis of small examples.
{ An important quantity in the analysis of meta-computation is the di erence in the costs of alternative object-computations ( in the above). The savings to be made by a meta-computation are proportional to , and the maximum savings (and consequently an upperbound for the amount of meta-e ort) are , and even less than that in the case of an informed initial ordering.
The overall conclusion from all of this is that meta-computations are not an unquali ed blessing, and that the savings to be made from such computations are often less than expected, and only occur within a narrowly de ned interval of meta-e ort. Before one decides to use meta-computation as a means to control object-computation, a careful analysis of crucial quantities like , and f(c m )
is required.
